The recent decision by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband has important lessons for any country facing a seemingly intractable insurgency. On May 12, the group stated that following its 12th Congress it will “dissolve the PKK’s organizational structure and end the armed struggle method”. The organisation has said that it will now pursue its goals “through democratic politics”.

The PKK’s decision follows talks between the Turkish government and the group’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who has been in Turkish custody since 1998. Regional dynamics, Turkish domestic politics, and personal ambition have all played key roles in bringing the conflict to this point.

Much uncertainty remains. The PKK and Turkey have embarked on peace processes before, only to return to conflict. But the group’s formal announcement of its intention to disband marks an important step towards ending an insurgency that has lasted over 40 years. If so, it will bring to an end a conflict that has cost all sides involved tens of thousands of lives.

The possibility of ending this insurgency not only raises questions about this specific conflict, but also what we know more broadly about how insurgencies end.

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

The PKK has a long track record of combining military action with political struggle. As with many other insurgent organisations, the group has worked to gain and maintain public support among ethnic Kurds, despite its use of violence.

Its strategy has also evolved over the years to adapt to circumstances. It moved away from the its original Marxist beginnings with the end of the cold war and over the years changed its fundamental aim from separatism to increased regional autonomy and local government, through the system of what it calls democratic confederalism. Over the decades the group and its affiliates have also decreased their use of terrorism in Europe and western Turkey.

This is in keeping with characteristics that researchers have found facilitate the transformation of organisations from armed groups to participants in institutional politics. There are a large number of cases in which insurgencies or terrorist organisations shifted – successfully or unsuccessfully – to either transform into a political party or combine with one.

There’s no doubt that military pressure has been important in downgrading the PKK as an insurgency. But military victories over the PKK have failed to end the conflict – in fact military oppression against the PKK has often backfired and reinforced public support for the group.

Many of the factors that have made it possible for the PKK to transform itself have been political, rather than narrowly military. Research by the RAND Corporation thinktank has found that rather than simply aiming to defeat an insurgency, it’s usually more effective to combine military pressure with political reform that aims to remove the reasons for the insurgency.

Combining armed force with political pressure

Turkey has taken this mixed approach, something many analysts have attributed to the foreign minister, Hakan Fidan. Ankara has pursued parallel tracks of negotiation and force. This has included improved counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency techniques, investment in drones and other military pressure.

But Ankara has in parallel cut off financial flows to the organisation, while strengthening economic opportunities for Kurdish citizens – particularly in western Turkey. Many Kurds moved west to escape violence in the traditionally Kurdish regions in Turkey’s southeast: Istanbul is now the city with the largest Kurdish population in Turkey.

The Turkish government has also strengthened its relationships with other Kurdish groups, primarily the Kurdistan Democratic Party in northern Iraq, to provide both military and political support.

This case is another example of the importance of blending strictly military tactics with diplomacy, economic policy and strategic communications. The celebrated Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz said that war is politics by other means – and many insurgencies are fundamentally political in nature. So this requires multiple lines of effort to be pursued in parallel to effectively respond to this – with an emphasis on political solutions rather than just the use of force.

This has been seen in conflicts with a number of insurgent groups in recent years – including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) or the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (Biaf) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. In all of these cases, central governments have engaged in constructive political dialogue, providing amnesty and other incentives for fighters to demobilise while offering broader concessions in order to build a more sustainable peace.

Successfully bringing insurgencies to and through a negotiated settlement requires long-term investment and effort. The issues that caused the insurgency in the first place do not simply disappear when the document is signed. In the case of the PKK, there are a number of ways in which this recent progress could be reversed. Concerns have been raised about whether the Turkish government will deliver on promised constitutional reforms or prisoner releases. There is also the question of whether PKK fighters will be willing and able to demobilise and reintegrate into society.

Research has indicated that states with flawed democracies have more difficulty ending insurgencies on favourable terms. Freedom House and similar organisations currently rank Turkey as “Not Free”. The country has been backsliding for years under the presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Despite these misgivings, the initial success of Turkey’s approach support previous research on how insurgencies end, and how armed groups might turn instead to politics. For the governments of countries facing insurgency, it means taking a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach to encourage this to happen. Governments may also need to move away from a binary definition of “winning” or “losing” to a more nuanced understanding of how all parties stand to gain from the end of an insurgency.

This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Rebecca Lucas, RAND Europe

Read more:

Rebecca Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.