How water fuels conflict in Pakistan

For ten days in April 2025, Pakistan almost came to a standstill. No freight was moving from its only port city, Karachi, towards the population centres in the north. The cause was the government’s announcement of a project to build six canals to irrigate the Cholistan Desert in the east of the country.

Protesters in the southern Sindh province, fearing diminished water supplies, demanded the immediate cancellation of the project and blocked all highways running northwards. The government soon relented, with prime minister Shehbaz Sharif announcing the project’s suspension in early May.

This was probably, at least in part, because the government was anticipating Indian military action. India blamed Pakistan for the Pahalgam terrorist attack, in which 26 people were killed in Indian-administered Kashmir the previous month. Internal squabbles had to be diffused in the face of external threats.

Geopolitics handed a temporary victory to the protesters. But the potential of water to cause conflict in Pakistan remains a live issue, from households using suction pumps to draw more than their share, to large inter-provincial disputes.

Wars and climate change are inextricably linked. Climate change can increase the likelihood of violent conflict by intensifying resource scarcity and displacement, while conflict itself accelerates environmental damage. This article is part of a series, War on climate, which explores the relationship between climate issues and global conflicts.

As someone who has researched water scarcity in Pakistan for 30 years, I argue that water conflict there is entirely avoidable. It is largely a function of the state’s obsession with supply-side mega projects and a lack of attention to questions of equitable access and quality.

At a time when the effects of climate change are becoming more severe, Pakistan can ill afford to continue its engineering-based approach to water if it is to ensure sufficient access for all.

According to the Pakistani government’s own figures, more than 95% of the available water in Pakistan is devoted to agriculture. It is used to cultivate water-guzzling crops, including rice and sugarcane. Pakistan is the fifth-largest producer and fourth-largest exporter of these crops.

Meanwhile the country’s teeming commercial centre of Karachi, with a population of 18 million, suffers from acute water shortages. Affluent neighbourhoods have water intensive date palms, exotic gardens, golf courses and swimming pools.

But for more than 80% of the city’s poorer neighbourhoods, there is almost complete dependence on water from tankers at up to 30 times the price richer neighbourhoods pay for regular piped water.

Water mains often become battle fronts in Karachi. My own research has documented many instances of violent conflict between different ethnicities and groups around manipulating water mains to gain access.

The minority Christian community in the Gujjar Nala neighbourhood of Karachi, for example, has engaged in violent clashes with the neighbouring Pashtun community over the operation of the regulating valve for allocating water to the two communities.

Conflict has also arisen between the city’s predominantly Urdu-speaking communities of Orangi Town and Altafnagar. Orangi residents attacked and destroyed the overhead water dispenser at the Altafnagar pumping station in early 2015 as it was siphoning water for Orangi to commercial water tankers.

Conflict between provinces

Pakistan is dependent on the Indus River and its tributaries for water. The system recharges the extensive Indus aquifer, which provides up to 80% of the water required for crops in the country.

Inter-provincial conflict over the distribution of Indus River water between upstream Punjab province, where several of Pakistan’s largest cities are located, and downstream Sindh province is an ongoing saga.

Sindh resents any new water mega projects in the powerful Punjab province. Along with the central government, Punjab wants to push forward dams and infrastructure projects in the name of development.

The Sindh-Punjab water conflict had a resolution of sorts in 1991, when the Inter-provincial Water Accord was signed. The agreement allocated water from the Indus River system among Pakistan’s four provinces.

However, Sindh’s civil society and government frequently accuse Punjab of violating the agreement by diverting water from the Indus River without the permission of the chief minister of Sindh, as required by the accord.

Sindhi and Punjabi nationalist politics heavily feature the water conflict in their rhetoric, which is proving corrosive for the federation of Pakistan.

Numerous dams and mining projects in the restive Balochistan province have also alienated the populace against the Pakistani government. They argue that dams are built with little local consultation and become hazards when they are swept away in flash floods. Around 30 dams in Balochistan were swept away during the 2022 floods.

At the same time, massive amounts of water are appropriated by foreign-owned mining operations there. These operations are of little benefit to local populations. The ongoing insurgency in the province, and the associated human rights abuses by the Pakistani state, are not divorced from the politics of water.

Pakistan’s water development paradigm is based on engineering and infrastructure. But under the greater uncertainty of climate change, what is needed is more adaptive and flexible management of water at the local scale.

The current approach locks the state into fixed management based on assumptions underlying the design parameters of the infrastructure.

During flood season, which typically runs from July to September, the design parameters of dams and other infrastructure are now routinely exceeded. Water has to be released to save the infrastructure, thereby accentuating flood peaks.

The bulk of agricultural water also comes from groundwater, but all the investment is in surface water. It is a common lament in Pakistan that groundwater has been left for unregulated exploitation by private electric pumps, with all the attention devoted to surface water.

In domestic water supply, the obsession for photogenic urban green spaces and mega supply projects also take away water from poor areas and resources from the much-needed maintenance of the distribution infrastructure.

Climate change is a wicked problem that defies centralised decision making in a country the size and diversity of Pakistan. Local knowledge and democratic decision making are the best arbiter of adjustment to climate change and equitable water access.

Yet, in a praetorian state like Pakistan, military-dominated governance is unfortunately moving in exactly the opposite direction.

This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Daanish Mustafa, King's College London

Read more:

• Pakistan’s floods are a disaster – but they didn’t have to be
• How countries in conflict zones can recover from floods – lessons from Pakistan
• India and Pakistan tension escalates with suspension of historic water treaty

The research cited in this article emerged from grants funded by United States Institute for Peace (USIP) & Royal Geographical Society.