The Sahel region, south of the Sahara, is notorious for being the global epicentre of terrorism. With a combined population of 75 million people, the region has accounted for more fatalities than any other on the African continent since 2021.

In 2024, deaths from terrorism across the region stood at 11,200: more than half of Africa’s toll that year.

The situation has deteriorated following the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The three countries are among the most affected in the troubled region. As of June 2025, these countries contributed to the more than 2.9 million people who have been displaced across the region, more than half of them being children.

As a political scientist with over 10 years of expertise on terrorism, insurgencies and extremism in west Africa, I have closely monitored the emergence, evolution and endurance of armed non-state actors.

Violent extremist groups operating across the region, affiliated to the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaida, have used tactics like kidnappings for ransom, ambushes, cattle rustling, and attacks on military formations.

Recent attacks have reflected the changing character of this hybrid warfare. Low-cost commercial drones have been weaponised and artificial intelligence has been adopted as part of a broader propaganda strategy. There have been forays into the world of cryptocurrency to diversify revenue sources.

These violent extremist groups have leveraged local grievances which have their roots in worsening socio-economic conditions, poor governance, weak institutions, and environmental degradation.

I have been tracking the rapid spread of one of the most powerful extremist groups in Africa: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM). JNIM seeks to expand beyond kidnappings for ransom, cattle rustling, human trafficking and taxes on local communities. It has its eyes set on gaining access to gold fields. Control of artisanal gold mines in parts of the Sahel region is a central part of its financial and strategic operations.

Given JNIM’s strength and capabilities, the group now poses an existential threat to Nigeria, which already faces multiple security threats. But the group can be quickly repelled with the right measures in place.

Who is JNIM?

JNIM was formed in 2017 and has up to 6,000 fighters. It is an al-Qaida affiliated group representing a coalition of armed groups driven by similar political ideologies. Al-Qaida is a terrorist organisation formed in the 1980s with the goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate governed by sharia law.

The Islamic State (IS), though also inspired by Al-Qaeda, has become a rival. It is a Sunni jihadist organisation that also seeks the establishment of a self-governing Islamic caliphate under strict sharia law.

JNIM continues to expand. The group has previously been mostly active in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. In May 2025, the group launched an attack in the town of Djibo, in Burkina Faso, which resulted in the deaths of 200 soldiers. In more recent times, it has carried out attacks in Benin, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire.

On 29 October 2025, JNIM recorded its first attack on Nigerian soil, which resulted in one fatality. The attack was on soldiers who were on patrol, in the north central state of Kwara, near the border with Benin, in the early hours of the day.

JNIM had indicated in June that it intended to set up a Katiba (a brigade) in Nigeria, thereby signalling an interest in establishing a presence in west Africa’s largest country.

Why Kwara State?

The choice of Kwara is significant and strategic, given its location at the centre of Nigeria and its proximity to the Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria’s seat of power.

Nigeria’s porous borders have been a major issue of national security concern which violent extremist groups like JNIM are keen to exploit. By establishing a footprint in Kwara State, the group could expand across other neighbouring states, including Niger State, close to the Federal Capital Territory. Another al-Qaida linked Boko Haram cell has already established a presence there, in Shiroro, in recent times.

This leaves other states, particularly Osun, vulnerable, given its proximity to Kwara.

In January this year, Nigeria’s Department of State Services dismantled an Islamic State cell in Osun state. The state has significant gold deposits.

Over the past two months, JNIM has enforced a fuel blockade in Mali’s Kayes region, which accounts for over 70% of Mali’s gold production.

With the recent rise in gold prices, the terror group has a greater incentive to tighten its grip on the region.

Nigeria’s response

Nigeria has made gains in its counterterrorism efforts, which have included military and non-military approaches. But a lot still needs to be done to avert threats such as those from terror groups.

A first step would be to strengthen border security and management by using advanced technologies, including facial recognition technology and unmanned aerial vehicles, to complement human intelligence on the ground.

The establishment of temporary military positions across Nigeria’s north central region for rapid deployment would provide useful offensive bulwarks against the advancement and expansion of armed groups into the north central region.

The sub-national states within the region must also get and use tactical early warning mechanisms.

Implications for the region

Insecurity in the Sahel region is worsening. Violent extremist groups are entering new territories such as Nigeria and parts of coastal west African states, including Benin, Togo, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.

The implications for regional peace, security and stability are dire. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, despite the juntas’ promises to bring an end to insecurity, a more realistic solution to the problem entails the restoration of democratic rule. That would pave the way to strengthening institutions that could address the root causes of the crisis.

This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Folahanmi Aina, SOAS, University of London

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Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.