Jurors aren’t impartial – that’s exactly why they are so important to justice

On the surface, the rationale for the UK government’s proposals to limit the use of jury trials in England and Wales is pragmatic. Over 78,000 crown court cases remain unresolved, creating years-long delays for victims and defendants alike.

But among those of us who research jury behaviour and decision-making, these proposals raise a deeper debate. Some argue that juries are too biased, too unreliable to deliver justice.

Their hope is that if we could replace them with trained legal professionals, we might finally reduce the role that bias plays in the courtroom. But is this even possible?

All observation is “theory-laden”. Scientists, politicians, judges and jurors are not immune to their biases and worldviews influencing their decision-making.

Both judges and juries bring biases to the courtroom. The critical difference is that juries are more diverse than a single judge. Today, 89% of judges are white, 61% are men, and around a third attended private school. Fewer than 10% come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.

This class and educational homogeneity matters profoundly. Judges who attended private school and Russell Group universities share not just demographic characteristics but formative experiences. Their relationships with authority, economic security, educational advantage and professional networks are likely to be less diverse than those of a jury.

Different social positions provide access to different knowledge. Someone who attended private school, joined chambers and rose through the judiciary simply hasn’t lived through experiences that would provide insight into many people’s lives.

For example, this might include how economic precarity affects people’s decisions, how working-class communities relate to police authority, or how educational disadvantages affect your ability to navigate bureaucratic systems.

These aren’t biases in the sense of prejudice. They are inevitable limitations of a single perspective.

When judges assess whether behaviour was “reasonable” or a complainant’s response was “credible”, they are making ethical evaluations that mix facts with values. A judge evaluating whether a working-class defendant’s actions were reasonable brings their own class experience to that judgment, whether they recognise it or not.

Twelve randomly selected citizens bring 12 different life experiences. Through deliberation, they must make those experiences visible and justify their interpretation to each other.

If a judge makes a decision on their own, only their own biases will influence the verdict. In a jury, consensus needs to be reached. Different opinions and perspectives will shape the outlooks of others. This makes the verdict more informed by community beliefs, rather than from specific sections of the community.

The human “bias” we worry about in juries is actually the diversity of experience and judgment that may improve group decision-making. Homogeneity masquerades as objectivity. Trials should be decided by the people – and the various human experiences they bring to the courtroom.

A jury drawn from the electoral register might include someone who left school at 16, someone who has experienced unemployment or housing insecurity, someone who’s worked in manual labour, or someone from a community where police relations are fraught. These aren’t just different backgrounds, they are different forms of knowledge about how society works for many people.

This diversity is important for both defendants and victims. Evidence shows that judges may be more likely to convict defendants compared with juries.

Any changes towards judge-only trials may disadvantage future defendants when compared with the current system, where a defendant can choose the option of a jury trial for certain types of offence.

How jury deliberation reduces bias

Our research – part of Elaine Jackson’s PhD – investigated Scottish jury deliberations in rape cases, revealing what kinds of bias jurors bring to them by staging a series of mock trials.

The research shows the influence of rape myths – stereotypes and false assumptions about how rape victims and perpetrators behave – in the courtroom, and how juries can both perpetuate and mitigate their influence.

Across 90 jurors in one mock trial, we identified 180 instances of rape myths. These included victim blaming, demanding impossible proof, framing assault as “heat of the moment”, and using “real rape” stereotypes such as expecting severe injuries and immediate reporting. These myths were pervasive across juror populations, not simply held by a few outliers.

But we also observed that jury deliberation could challenge these assumptions. Both guilty verdicts occurred when a strong foreperson (the jury’s spokesperson) voiced immediate challenges to these myths, or trauma-informed jurors countered these frameworks. For example, when one juror suggested that the accused offering wine to the victim meant sexual invitation, another challenged them, asking: “According to what logic?”

We believe it’s positive that the UK government’s proposals will retain jury trials in cases of rape and murder. In serious crimes, we need diversity of thought and opinion in our decision-making.

This collective scrutiny, 12 different perspectives negotiating with each other, is something an individual judge cannot replicate.

While judges may consult colleagues, at trial stage they ultimately decide alone – without a formal deliberation requiring them to defend their interpretations to others who have equal decision-making authority. A diverse jury has this built-in corrective mechanism, which is why it must remain a part of the UK’s legal system.

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This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Elaine Jackson, University of Glasgow; University of the West of Scotland; Lee John Curley, Glasgow Caledonian University, and Martin Lages, University of Glasgow

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.