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On this episode of The David Frum Show, The Atlantic’s David Frum opens with his thoughts on the unceremonious end of the Department of Government Efficiency. He examines the legacy DOGE leaves behind, why it failed, and how it became yet another example of the Trump administration’s drive to make America’s government weaker and smaller.

David is then joined by the historian and biographer Sam Tanenhaus to discuss his sweeping new biography of William F. Buckley Jr., Buckley: The Life and the Revolution That Changed America. Frum and Tanenhaus reflect on the Buckley they both knew, exploring his strengths, his flaws, and his influence on the American conservative movement from the 1960s onward.

Finally, David closes with a discussion of Booth Tarkington’s novel Alice Adams and the lessons we can still take from a once-celebrated, now often-derided work of American literature.

The following is a transcript of the episode:

David Frum:  Hello, and welcome to The David Frum Show. I’m David Frum, a staff writer at The Atlantic. My guest this week will be Sam Tanenhaus, author of the important biography of William F. Buckley, the founder of modern conservatism. This week, the last week of November, 2025, marks the 100th birthday of William Buckley. And Sam and I, on this occasion, will be discussing Sam’s book, William Buckley’s life, and [Buckley’s] impact on the two of us because we both knew him and admired him very much. My book this week will be the novel Alice Adams, by Booth Tarkington, published also almost exactly 100 years ago.

Before the dialogue or the book, I want to open with a few preliminary thoughts about the expiry of the so-called Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE. DOGE was never really a department of government. It had a kind of extralegal existence. It was a creature of the president. But in the opening months of the Trump presidency, it dominated the agenda. It created havoc across the U.S. government and across the lives of many, many government employees and many people who depend on the U.S. government for services. I think, as it expires now, almost at the end of the year 2025, I think it’s fair to render the verdict that DOGE was an almost total fiasco. It failed to achieve its own stated goals of making any impact in government spending. The fiscal situation at the end of President [Donald] Trump’s first year is much, much worse than it was under President [Joe] Biden. Total debt—not that these numbers mean anything anymore, they’re so big—the total debt of the United States is now approaching $40 trillion and will continue to climb through the Trump presidency and beyond.

The root of the problem was that President Trump maintains very high levels of spending, is raising spending on defense, has made permanent the tax cuts that were supposed to be temporary when they were passed in 2025—sorry, 2017. They were now renewed in 2025, and they will last indefinitely. And DOGE and Trump’s big plan to offset the impact of his spending and his tax cuts is his tariff regime, which, first, doesn’t raise all that much money. Second, he’s already spent the money multiple times over: He’s promised to give the money to the farmers. He’s promised to rebate the money to the American consumer. He’s promised to rebate much more than the tariffs are collecting to the American consumer. And anyway, the tariffs are probably illegal and may well shrink or disappear very, very soon. So the DOGE failed entirely in its object. But I think it is worth thinking about why it failed and what legacy it leaves behind.

DOGE failed for three main reasons. The first was it was run by arrogant people who did not take the trouble to understand what they were doing. Elon Musk approached the problem of reducing government spending as a kind of coding error, a problem of computer engineering. You didn’t need any subject-matter expertise. You didn’t need to understand how health-care programs worked or how the Department of Defense worked. Just as a website is a website is a website, so he figured that solving the problems of overspending was solving the problems of overspending. You didn’t need to know anything in particular—=; you just fired people and saw what happened later. So in their arrogance and in their high-handedness, they didn’t bother to learn anything. And so they began cutting wires, metaphorically, and discovered that they were connected—those wires ran important machines.

But second, because they didn’t understand how government worked, or understand their subject matter, what they were doing, they completely misdiagnosed the problem. Government does have fraud, of course, and it has inefficiency, of course. A lot of the inefficiency is there to prevent fraud; that’s why there’s so much paperwork, is to make it difficult for people to steal. But even with the certain undeniable amounts of fraud and inefficiency that there are in government, they’re just not big drivers of the way the U.S. government spends. Most money flows out in direct payments to people, Social Security; or it flows out in direct payment to hospitals, Medicare and Medicaid; or it flows out to pay for the national defense. You have to wrestle with those problems, and the idea that you’re going to find cases of obvious [duplication] of spending or spending that achieves nothing, especially when you don’t know how anything works, that’s just—because they were arrogant, they didn’t study the problem. Because they didn’t study the problem, they addressed the wrong problem. And because they addressed the wrong problem—looking for inefficiency and fraud—instead of actually having to reduce services to people and products, they failed.

But the last thing that they did, and this is maybe the most important, was they broke the law. Under the law of the United States, once the House approves an appropriation, once the Senate confirms the appropriation, once Congress agrees on a budget—or any kind of spending mechanism—and once the president signs it, the president’s people cannot rescind that spending. What Trump was doing was claiming, through DOGE, a power to revoke government spending that Congress had passed and the president had signed. And that’s just illegal. Now, there are some states that give the governor a line-item veto, where, when a budget is presented to him, he can strike this item or that item. And maybe that’s a good idea, and maybe that’s not a good idea. But the president doesn’t have that power, and he certainly does not have the power to rescind the spending after he or his predecessor have signed the spending. So DOGE collapsed in the end because, again, they were too conceited to find out what they were doing; therefore, they did the wrong thing.

But DOGE does leave a legacy, and that is something we need to address. When you think about What did DOGE do?, the DOGE people were, on the nicest reading of what happened, were careless, or maybe something more sinister than careless, so that’s one legacy.

The second is that DOGE did enduring harm to scientific and biomedical and climate research. The cuts made to the National Institutes of Health, the agencies that study the oceans and the air, those are difficult to undo. The people who worked in those jobs are very valuable people. Now, they’ve chosen public service either because that’s what they wanted or because they liked the benefits or because it suited their family life. But once you dispense them from public service, they will find other work to do. And you can’t simply blow a whistle and say, Okay, everybody come back. They have not been idling and collecting unemployment insurance; they’ve gone on to often more-lucrative jobs in the private sector. And it’s going to be difficult to call them back. Or they’ll be redirected from researching the kinds of things that National Institutes of Health do to the kinds of things that universities and other people do, and they’re different. So there has been a deep and enduring damage to the scientific-research capabilities of the United States government.